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 ABSTRACT 
FINITE BARGAINING PROBLEMS 
BY 
HANJI WU 
MAY 2007 
Committee Chair: Dr. Yongsheng Xu 
Major Department: Economics 
Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or 
more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the 
outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this 
outcome. 
This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work in 1950 
(Nash 1950). Since then, numerous studies have been done on bargaining problems 
with convex feasible set or with non-convex but comprehensive feasible set. There is, 
however, little work on finite bargaining problems. 
In this dissertation, we study finite bargaining problems systematically by 
extending the standard bargaining model to the one consisting of all finite bargaining 
problems. For our bargaining problems, we first propose the Nash, Maximin, Leximin, 
Maxiproportionalmin, Lexiproportianlmin solutions, which are the counterparts of 
those that have been studied extensively in both convex and non-convex but 
comprehensive problems. We then axiomatically characterize these solutions in our 
context. 
 xi
 We next introduce two new solutions, the maximin-utilitarian solution and the 
utilitarian-maximin solution, each of which combines the maximin solution and 
utilitarian solution in different ways. The maximin-utilitarian solution selects the 
alternatives from the maximin solution that have the greatest sum of individuals’ 
utilities, and the utilitarian-maximin solution selects the maximin alternatives from 
the utilitarian solution. These two solutions attempt to combine two important but 
very different ethical principles to produce compromised solutions to bargaining 
problems.     
Finally, we discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution. The egalitarian 
solution in finite bargaining problems is more complicated than its counterpart in 
either convex or non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems. Given its 
complexity in our context, we start our inquiry by investigating two-person, finite 
bargaining problems, and then extend some of the analysis to n-person, finite 
bargaining problems.    
Our analysis of finite bargaining problems and axiomatic characterizations of 
the extensions of various standard solutions of convex/non-convex but comprehensive 
bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems will shed new light on the behavior 
of these solutions.  Our new solutions will expand our understanding of the 
bargaining theory and distributive justice from a different perspective.  
 xii
  
CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bargaining Problems 
In the problem of distributing a fixed amount of goods, how should we 
determine who gets what? A bargaining is a process to decide how to divide a shared 
resource between two or more participants.  
A pure bargaining problem is described as follows: a group of two or more 
participants is faced with a set of feasible alternatives, and any alternative can be the 
outcome of the problem if a unanimous agreement among all the participants is 
reached at that alternative. In the event of no unanimous agreement, a given 
disagreement alternative is specified as the outcome. If at least two of the participants 
differ over which alternative is most preferable, there is a need for bargaining and 
negotiation over which alternative should be agreed upon. 
To summarize, there are four components in a bargaining problem.  
1. Players: a group of two or more participants who distribute a fixed amount of 
goods. Each player has the ability to veto any outcome different from the 
disagreement outcome since unanimity is required for reaching an agreement.  
2. Feasible set: The set of all feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the 
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outcome of the problem if it is specified by the unanimous agreement. The 
disagreement point defined below is one element in the feasible set. An alternative in 
the feasible set of a bargaining problem can be represented by an n-tuple of real 
numbers, where the i-th component is the amount of the goods the player i can get 
from that outcome. Another interpretation of an alternative in the feasible set is that 
the i-th component is the utility of the player i for the alternative in question. In our 
model, we take the latter interpretation. A feasible set in our model is represented by a 
subset of the n dimensional Euclidean space.  
According to different economic settings, the feasible set can be one of the 
following:  
a. Convex feasible set: Under the assumption that the players may agree to 
randomize between alternatives if they so choose and the utility is disposable, the 
feasible set S is typically convex as illustrated in Figure1. We can see in Figure 1, any 
convex combination of any two outcomes in the set lies in the set.  
 
Figure 1. Convex Feasible Set. 
  
x1
x2
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b. Non-convex but comprehensive feasible set and finite feasible set: If we drop 
the assumption that the players can randomize between outcomes, the feasible set 
faced by the players will not always be convex. Figure 2 illustrates a feasible set 
which is non-convex but comprehensive.  
 
Figure 2. Non-Convex but Comprehensive Feasible Set. 
x1
x2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. If we further relax the assumption that the utility is not disposable, the 
players will face a more rigid feasible set in which the outcomes in the feasible may 
be discrete and finite. Figure 3 illustrates a feasible set which is discrete and finite.  
 
Figure 3. Finite Feasible Set 
x1
x2 
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3. Solution: A solution to a bargaining problem specifies the alternatives that 
the players unanimously agree on. It is the result of the bargaining and final decision 
of who getting what.  
4. Disagreement point: In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, a 
given disagreement outcome is specified as the final outcome. That means that any 
individual has the option of choosing the disagreement outcome and ensure that it will 
be the outcome of the game by vetoing other alternatives. A player would always 
compare the payoff from an alternative with that from the disagreement point and 
decide to agree on which alternative to be the final outcome.    
Axiomatic Approach 
There are two approaches to study bargaining problems and both are presented 
by Nash: axiomatic and strategic. The axiomatic approach specifies some desirable 
properties that the outcome of a bargaining process should satisfy and on the other 
hand identifies the bargaining rule that produces the outcome.   
Concentrating on two-person bargaining problems, John Nash (1950) took an 
axiomatic approach and presented a framework in which a unique feasible alternative 
is selected as the “solution” to a given bargaining problem. Thus, the solution to a 
problem is a rule which selects the outcome from the problem. Nash (1950) proposed 
that a solution possesses the following properties:  
1. Efficiency: Efficiency requires that the solution select an outcome which is 
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efficient. This property restricts the solution to the points on the “contract curve” as 
described in Edgeworth (1881) and Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944).  
2. Symmetry: If a bargaining problem is symmetric in respect to disagreement 
point, that is, the problem is in disagreement point symmetry, each player should get 
the same level of utility because the bargaining power of each player is the same.  
3. Scale invariance: The solution is invariant with respect to a linear 
transformation of the utility. In Nash’s solution, utility function satisfies expected 
utility theory and is unique up to a linear transformation.  
4. Contraction independence, also called independence of irrelevant alternatives: 
It says that the outcome of a bargaining problem will continue to be selected when the 
bargaining problems shrinks and the initially selected outcome is still available.  
Nash (1950) proved that the solution satisfying the above four properties is 
uniquely equivalent to the outcome that maximizes the product of individual utilities 
of the participants. This solution has become known as the Nash solution.  
Another reason for an axiomatic approach is that an axiomization of a solution 
can help us to understand the solution by breaking it down into several pieces, which 
are the corresponding properties uniquely determining the solution. Those properties 
are typically simple and easily understood in comparison with the solution itself. 
The properties can also help us to test the validity of a solution. In reality, it is 
hard to measure the utility of every player. So we can hardly tell if the result of a 
bargaining is the maximization of the product of all players’ utility or not. But the 
properties that uniquely determine the Nash’s solution are more easily to be tested 
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conceptually as well as empirically. If we can observe any of the properties failing the 
empirical test, we can then conclude that the solution which possesses this property 
can not pass the empirical test.   
Existing Studies 
Convex Problems 
Since Nash (1950)’s seminal work, many economists have contributed to 
bargaining theory by challenging the four properties that uniquely determine Nash’s 
solution, or by putting forward other reasonable properties that Nash’s solution fails to 
satisfy.  
 In the four axioms which uniquely determine Nash’s solution, the scale 
invariance and contraction independence have been the focus of criticism. These two 
axioms have been challenged on conceptual grounds as well as by empirical tests, for 
example, see Crott (1971), De Menil (1971), Fouraker and Siegel (1963), Nydegger 
and Owen (1974), O’Neill  (1976),  Rapoport, Guyer and Gordon (1976), Rapoport, 
Frenkel and Perner (1977), Siegel and Fouraker (1960), and Stone (1958). There are 
various other solutions suggested and studied, and alternative properties are 
considered. 
In response to the property of scale independence, Shapley (1969) argued that 
the solution should be insensitive to a more general utility transformation which 
preserves the ordinality of utility functions of the players. That is, the bargaining 
solution should be invariant of any increasing transformation. But his studies showed 
that the independence of ordinal transformations is a very strong requirement and it is 
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in contradiction with some other standard properties, such as strong individual 
rationality and contraction independence. Roth (1979c)  and Roth and Malouf (1979)  
presented a bargaining solution in a two-player model which possesses the 
independence will still be satisfied if the transformation (1) preserves each player’s 
ordinal preference and (2) preserves information about which player makes larger 
gains at any given point. This independence property as well as other standard 
property specifies an outcome that is the strongly Pareto optimal point and that 
maximizes the minimum gains available to the players. This solution is the 
counterpart of the leximin solution in our finite bargaining problems to be introduced 
in Chapter IV. We will characterize this solution with different properties in Chapter 4.   
Nash’s contraction independence models a bargaining process which can 
proceed by first narrowing down the original set of feasible alternatives to some 
smaller set which includes the outcome identified by the solution, without changing 
the outcome. This axiom came under a lot of criticism (Luce and Raiffa 1957，128). In 
particular, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Kalai (1977b) criticized this axiom by 
pointing out that the narrowing of the original set may cost the bargaining power of a 
player in the bargaining problem and questioned the validity of this axiom. 
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate two bargaining problems with the same 
disagreement point (0,0).  
Figure 4 illustrates a problem with the feasible set: =convex hull 
  
1S
)}.0,0(),0,1(),1,0{(
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Figure 4. A Bargaining Problem. 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 both illustrate a narrowed problem compared with the 
problem in Figure 4. The feasible set of the problem is =convex hull 2S
)}.0,0(),0,
2
1(),
2
1,
2
1(),1,0{(  
 
Figure 5. Narrowed Bargaining Problem and Nash Solution 
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Figure 6. Narrowed Bargaining Problem with Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution 
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Nash’s solution of is: ),0( 1S .2
1,
2
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛  By axiom of contraction independence, 
the solution of is),0( 2S ,2
1,
2
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ too, as in Figure 5. The alternatives in the set 
have no impact on the result. But in problem , player 2 has lost his 
favorable alternatives and player 1 has a good reason to demand that he or she should 
get more. In order to overcome this difficulty, Kalai-Smorodinsky presented a solution 
which depends not only on the disagreement payoff but also on the maximal payoffs 
each player might hope to receive. Thus Kalai-Smorodinsky solution does not possess 
the property of the insensitivity of so called irrelevant alternative available to 
participants. 
BCD ),0( 2S
From the definition of Nash solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, for the 
problem Nash solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are the same: ,1S
.
2
1,
2
1)()( 11 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== SFSF KSN  
For problem Nash solution satisfies the axiom of contraction independence, ,2S
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so ,
2
1,
2
1)()( 12 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== SFSF  the loss of favorable alternatives in area BCD doesn’t 
change the bargaining power of Player 2. 
Figure 6 illustrates .
3
1,
3
2)( 2 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=SF KS Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is monotone 
to the maximal payoffs each player might receive. 
Besides the solutions mentioned above, philosophers and other economists have 
also proposed a variety of bargaining solutions for “just” allocations. For example, 
egalitarian solution chooses an outcome giving equal utility to each player and lying 
on the utility frontier. The egalitarian solution satisfies these properties: weak 
efficiency, symmetry, and contraction independence and fails scale invariance. As 
another example, the utilitarian solution chooses an outcome maximizing the sum of 
all players’ utilities. The utilitarian solution satisfies these properties: efficiency, 
contraction independence.  
Non-convex Bargaining Problems 
The existing studies on bargaining problems mostly concentrate on those with 
convex feasible set obtained by the assumptions that each player agrees to randomize 
between outcomes and that the utility is disposable. The former assumption is also 
required in the expected utility theory, which plays an important role in Nash’s 
solution. The convex feasible set has its limitations in several contexts in economics. 
Non-convex bargaining problems can arise in many economic contexts, for example, 
when individuals are non-expected utility maximizers. They can also arise naturally in 
bargaining problems when individuals are not characterized by their utilities but by 
 
 11
their functionings and capability sets presented in the sense of Sen (1985). Also see 
Xu and Yoshihara (2005) for such cases.  
In recent years, non-convex bargaining problems have been attracted much 
attention by researchers. See for example, Kaneko (1980), Herrero (1989) , Conley 
and Wilkie (1991; 1996), Mariotti (1998), Xu and Yoshihara (2006), and Zhou (1997). 
These studies defined and characterized the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution and the egalitarian solutions for comprehensive and compact but not 
necessarily convex bargaining problems. These studies on non-convex bargaining 
problems have extended our insights into the solutions of the bargaining problems. On 
the other hand their focus is still on comprehensive and compact problems, the 
definitions and characterizations of solutions are fairly similar to those for bargaining 
problems with convex feasible sets. Meanwhile, studies on non-convex and finite 
bargaining problems are still few in the literature. 
A Few Studies on Finite Bargaining Problems 
There are some discussions on finite bargaining problems in the literature. For 
example, Mariotti (1998) characterized the Nash solution for domains including or 
consisting of feasible sets with finite number of alternatives. Following a similar 
approach as Mariotti (1998), Tanaka and Nagahisa (2002) characterize the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) for the finite domain. 
There is, however, a lack of systematic study on finite bargaining problems. This 
dissertation provides a thorough and systematic study of finite bargaining problems. 
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Motivation of Our Studies on Finite Bargaining Problems 
The Economic Settings of Finite Problems 
Our interests in finite bargaining problems arise from two observations.   
First, in most practical bargaining situations, the alternatives available to players 
are often finite, and the players can not always randomize the alternatives available. 
Thus the assumption of convex feasible set is not attainable. For example, it is often 
the case that, when a union bargains with a firm, there are only a few options 
available on the table for both parties to consider.  
Secondly, finite bargaining problems can also arise with indivisible goods and 
no side payments. There are extensive studies on indivisible goods in the literature, 
see, for example, Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), Maskin (1987), Quinzii (1984), 
Svensson (1987) . These studies mainly focus on allocation rules. In this essay, we 
study similar issues from the perspective of bargaining theory. In an economy with 
indivisible goods, extensions of conventional bargaining theory to non-convex but 
comprehensive problems are therefore unsatisfactory because, when goods are 
indivisible, it is not plausible to make the assumption that we can obtain any level of 
utility in our imagination since the goods with which we generate utility are discrete. 
As a consequence, finite bargaining problems arise naturally in such settings. 
An Example 
We can find the example of finite bargaining problems in air traffic control. In 
air traffic control, every flight is assigned departure and arrival slots, flights routes 
and gates. Air traffic controllers use strict rules of thumb. For example, Ball et al. 
(2000) evaluated two rules: (1) first come first serve used often for aircraft that want 
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to depart or have missed their slot: They are directly put at the end of the queue of 
aircraft waiting to be scheduled; And (2) ground delay programs: if an airport is at its 
maximum capacity, all incoming aircraft are delayed an equal amount of time. These 
rules are strictly executed by air traffic controller and they are hardly to be persuaded 
to deviate from these rules, though sometimes deviation of the rules results in more 
efficiency. That’s because such a deviation requires the judge of the air traffic 
controller and this kind of judge may be inconsistent in different circumstance, and 
would violate an important underlying principle in air traffic control: fairness. These 
rules of thumb provide some assurance that different airlines will be treated equally. 
Jonker, Meyer and Dignum (2005) described one condition under which the air 
traffic controller would be willing to deviate from their rules of thumb: when the 
multi-player bargaining could provide a solution. The airline companies would 
negotiate among each other about plan changes. When doing this, they could 
explicitly compare each other utilities and adapt their behavior accordingly, and could 
achieve higher efficiency. This is a finite bargaining. The resources they divide are 
departure and arrival slots, flights routes and gates. And during their bargaining, there 
are no side payments in them.  
Comparison of Existing Studies and Finite Bargaining Problems 
To study finite bargaining problems, we first note that the definition of a 
solution may be different from the classical bargaining problems.  This is because a 
solution obtainable in the classical problems may not be feasible for discrete and 
finite problems. For example, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the egalitarian 
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solution defined in convex problems may not always exist in finite problems. 
Secondly, in finite problems, a solution is typically multi-valued. Thirdly, some 
properties, for example, the scale invariance axiom, characterizing solutions for 
convex bargaining problems may not be applicable to finite problems and may call for 
different interpretations even when they continue to be applicable in finite problems.   
From the analysis above we can see, there is a necessity of our study on finite 
bargaining problems. 
The Structure of This Essay 
In this essay, we will provide a systematic study of finite bargaining problems by 
first formalizing the problem, then defining various solutions to bargaining problems 
in a discrete and finite domain, exploring various properties to be imposed on a 
solution to finite bargaining problems, and characterizing alternative solutions 
proposed in our context. The specific solutions that we are interested in are the Nash, 
maxmin, leximin, maxiproportionalmin, lexiproportionalmin, utilitarian, 
maximin-utilitarian, and utilitarian-maximin solutions, and several variants of the 
egalitarian solution.   
The essay is organized as follows: In Chapter II, we model the finite problem 
and provide notations and some definitions used in this essay. In Chapter III, we 
present the properties which we use in the characterizations of various solutions. 
Chapter IV defines and characterizes our first set of solutions for finite bargaining 
problems. In Chapter V, we study the utilitarian, maximin-utilitarian and 
utilitarian-maximin solutions.  Discussions of several variants of the egalitarian 
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sol,ution are given in Chapter V. Chapter VI summarizes the dissertation by 
presenting a brief conclusion and outlining our main contribution to the understanding 
of axiomatic bargaining problems.   
 
 CHAPTER 2.  
MODEL, NOTATIONS AND SOME DEFINITIONS 
The Mathematic Model of Finite Problems 
Let be the set of players with  Let be the set of all 
non-negative real numbers,  be the 
},,1{ nN K= .2≥n +R
nR+ −n dimensional non-negative Euclidean 
space.  
A bargaining game is described by a set of players and a pair where 
 is the feasible set with each element in
N ),,( dA
nRA +⊂ A being a utility vector specifying 
payoffs to each player and Ad∈  is the disagreement point. We normalize  to 0.  
Let B
d
{ φ≠∩∈⊆= +++ nn RAARA ,0 and }∞<≤ A#2 . Each A in B is considered as a 
(normalized) bargaining problem with  as the disagreement point, and B is the 
family of all finite normalized bargaining problems each of which contains at least 
one element such that every player’s utility is strictly greater than the disagreement 
point = 0. That is, for each 
nR+∈0
d ∈A B, there exists Aa∈ such that for all    0>ia .Ni∈
A solution to a bargaining problem is a function defined over B such that 
 is a non-empty subset of A for any 
F
)(AF ∈A B. That is, a solution is a rule which 
assigns to each bargaining problem a set of utility feasible vectors of the problem. 
Some Notations and Definitions 
Letπ be a permutation of  The set of all permutations of is denoted.N N
 16
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by . .Π
As usual, for every we write ,, nRyx +∈ yx > to mean for all 
and , and 
ii yx ≥[
Ni∈ ]yx ≠ yx >> to mean  for all ii yx >[ ]Ni∈ . 
For each , define nRx +∈ )(xΘ as the vector where 
such that 
),,,,,( )()()1( ni xxx θθθ KK
,Π∈Θ ).( )()()1( ni xxx θθθ ≤≤≤≤ KK  For each , we sometimes 
write as 
nRx +∈
)(xΘ ),)(,,)(,)(x( 21 nxx ΘΘ KΘ with .)(,,)()( 21 nxxx Θ≤≤Θ≤Θ L  
Definition 2.1: . For every yx lexi min≥
,, nRyx +∈ yx lexi min≥ ⇔ ),)()([( 21 yx Θ>Θ or ))()(,)()(( 2211 yxyx Θ>ΘΘ=Θ orK  
or ].)()(,)()(,,)()(( 1111 nnnn yxyxyx Θ>ΘΘ=ΘΘ=Θ −−K  
Definition 2.2. symmetric. For each −k }1,,1{ −∈ nk K and each we 
say that is symmetric if 
,nRx +∈
x −k .)()()( 1 nkk xxx Θ==Θ=Θ + K Note that, for 
is symmetric if ,1=k x −k .21 nxxx === K  
Definition 2.3. Ideal point : For each bargaining problem )(Am A∈B, 
let },),,,(|max{)( 1 AaaaaAm niii ∈≡ KK and )).(,),(()( 1 AmAmAm nK≡ The point 
is commonly called the ideal point of Clearly, for each )(Am .A 0)( >>Am A∈B.  
Definition 2.4. Center point: We define : B , such that mm nR+→ α=)(Amm , 
and ==== nααα K21 ).{(minmax iNiAx x∈∈  We call the point the center 
point of the problem. 
)(Amm
The ideal point and center point of a problem are illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Ideal Point and Center Point 
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Definition 2.5. Symmetric problem: For each A∈B, a bargaining problem is 
said to be symmetric if, for every ,nRa +∈ AaAa ∈⇒∈ )(π for all .Π∈π  
Definition 2.6: Pigou-Dalton domination: For every we say that 
Pigou-Dalton dominates if for some 
,, nRyx +∈
x y 0>ε and some 
,, Nji ∈ εε −=≤=+ jjii yxxy[ and kk xy = for all }].,{\ jiNk ∈  
Comparing two utility vectors, ,, yx we can see that the sum of the player’s 
utilities in alternative is the same as that in alternative When a small amount of 
utility is transferred from a better-off player to a worse-off player while keeping their 
relative ranking in terms of utilities unchanged, we may argue that the inequality 
measured in terms of utility in y is less than that in x.  In other words, y is more 
equitable than x in the utility space.  The Pigou-Dalton domination in our context is 
in the same spirit as the Pigou-Dalton transfer in the discussion of income inequality.  
See, for example, Sen (1985, 27).  
x .y
 
 CHAPTER 3.  
PROPERTIES 
In this chapter we present the properties that are used to characterize the various 
solutions to our finite bargaining problems. 
Efficiency Properties 
First two are standard efficiency properties. 
Axiom 3.1. Efficiency (E): For any A∈B and any ( )a F A∈ , there is no 
such that . x A∈ x a>
Efficiency is the standard axiom which requires that the solution satisfies the 
Pareto efficiency. That is, for any bargaining problem, there is no outcome in the 
feasible set, such that, a movement from the solution to that outcome can make at 
least one player better off, without making any other players worse off. 
Axiom 3.2. Weak Efficiency (WE): For any A∈B and any , there is 
no such that . 
( )a F A∈
x A∈ ax >>
Weak efficiency is another standard efficiency type axiom and is weaker than 
efficiency. It requires that the solution is the one where there is no outcome in the 
feasible set that would be strictly preferred by all agents. 
Some Standard Properties 
The following properties are extensions of several standard properties first 
described in convex bargaining problems.
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Axioim 3.3. Scale Invariance (SC): For all A∈  B and all nRα ++∈ , if 
{( ) : }i i i NA a a Aα α ∈= ∈  then ( ) {( ) : ( )i iF A a a F A }α α= ∈ . 
This axiom is an extension of its counterpart for Nash’s (1950) original axiom of 
scale invariance. In our context, it maintains the claim that measuring utility is 
invariant to the cardinal scale. Note that each player can use a different scale to 
measure utility implying that there is no interpersonal comparison of players’ utilities 
and the utility is cardinal. 
Axiom 3.4. Symmetry (S): For any A∈  B, if A is symmetric, then 
[ ( ) ( ) (a F A A F A)π∈ ⇒ ∈ for all ]π ∈Π . 
In Nash’s (1950) original model, Symmetry property requires that, in a 
symmetric problem, each player gets exactly the same level of utility because each 
player has the same bargaining power. In our finite bargaining problem, even if the 
problem is symmetric, the outcome in which each player gets the same level of utility 
may not be available. We can not distinguish one player from another in a symmetric 
problem, a solution should treat players symmetrically in a symmetric problem. This 
version of the conventional Symmetry property is sometimes called Anonymity as 
well. 
Axiom 3.5 Domination (D): For any A∈B and any ,Ax∈ if for 
some then  
ax >
),(AFa∈ ).(AFx∈
Domination says that, for any bargaining problem A , if there is an 
alternative inx A such that is greater than some outcome in the solution 
then must be a part of the solution of 
x a
),(AF x A as well. 
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Axiom 3.6. Strong Individual Rationality (SIR): For each ∈A B, if 
then  )(AFa∈ .0>>a
Strong Individual Rationality requires that a solution to any bargaining problem 
must assign positive utility for every player. This is a slightly stronger requirement 
than the conventional axiom of individual rationality which only requires that a 
solution assign non-negative utility to every player. In our context, given that each 
problem contains at least one alternative given positive utility for each player, this is a 
fairly reasonable requirement. 
Contraction Independence 
In this subsection we introduce two properties that relate to the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives originally proposed by Nash (1950). 
Axiom 3.7. Contraction Independence (CI): For any ,A B∈B, if 
B A⊆ and ( )B F A φ∩ ≠ , then ( ) ( )F B B F A= ∩ . 
This axiom is an extension of the independence of irrelevant alternatives which 
first appeared in Nash (1950). Its intuition is that an alternative which is not a part of 
the solution is not a relevant solution candidate when the problem “shrinks”.  If we 
remove alternatives that we did not choose as a part of the solution to a bargaining 
problem, we might desire that our solution to the new bargaining problem remains the 
same as that to the original problem. Precisely, it requires that, if the intersection of 
the problem after the contraction and the solution of the original problem is not empty, 
then this intersection is the solution to the problem after contraction. 
 Axiom 3.8. Weak Contraction Independence (WCI): For any ,A B∈B with 
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),()( BmAm =  if B A⊆ and ( )B F A φ∩ ≠ , then ( ) ( )F B B F A= ∩ . 
(WCI) has been used for both convex (Yu 1973) and non-convex (Xu and 
Yoshihara 2006) problems. Compared with ordinary contraction independence, it is 
weakened by additional requirement that the ideal points of the original problem and 
the problem after the contraction are the same.  
Expansion Properties 
The expansion properties discussed below deal with the consistency of a 
solution when we enlarge the problem by adding new alternatives to the original 
problem. 
Axiom 3.9. Expansion Consistency (EC): For each ∈BA,  B with , if BA⊆
A is symmetric, and is weakly efficient on then  )(}{ AFa = a ,B ).(BFa∈
Expansion Consistency requires that, given a symmetric problem A that has 
as the unique solution, whena A is enlarged to B so that B  is a superset of A , and 
if continues to be weakly efficient ona B , then should be in the solution of a B .  
 
Figure 8. Expansion Properties. 
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The intuition behind expansion properties, take expansion consistency for 
example, is that, when the outcome of a problem which we denote with , has some 
“desirable quality”-being the unique solution to a symmetric problem, then if we 
enlarge the original problem to a larger one by adding other alternatives, and if, in the 
new problem, there is no alternative that dominates , we can not exclude  from 
the solution to the new problem. 
a
a a
The spirit of the expansion consistency is similar to a property considered by 
Thomson and Myerson (1980) discussed below:  
Independence of Undominated Alternatives (Thomson and Myerson 1980): 
For each ∈BA,  B , for every )(AFa∈ , if and is weakly efficient on 
then  
BA ⊆ a
,B ).(BFa∈
Several variants of expansion consistency are introduced and discussed below.   
Axiom 3.10. Expansion Independence (EI): For each  B with 
and for some
∈BA,
,BA ⊆ },1,,2,1{ −∈ nk K if ),(}{ AFa = a is −k symmetric, [for each 
,\ ABb∈ ,,)()( 11 Kab Θ≤Θ kk ab )()( Θ≤Θ ], and is efficient on a B , then 
 ).(BFa∈
Expansion Independence is in the same spirit as Expansion consistency, and 
requires that, when a given problem A has a unique solution which is 
symmetric for some  if 
a
−k ,k A  is enlarged to B in a certain way so that is 
efficient on 
a
B and the added alternatives are not lexicographically greater than , 
then should be in the solution of 
a
a B . 
Axiom 3.11. Restricted Expansion Consistency (REC): For each  B ∈BA,
 
 24
with , if BA⊆ A and B are both symmetric, )(}{ AFa = and is weakly efficient 
on then 
a
,B ).(BFa∈  
Restricted Expansion Consistency is a restricted version of (EC) in that, it 
restricts the applicability of the axiom to the situation in which the original problem 
and the enlarged problem are both symmetric.  
Axiom 3.12. Weak Expansion Independence (WEI): For each  B 
with and and for each 
∈BA,
BA⊆ ),()( BmAm = },1,,2,1{ −∈ nk K if is 
symmetric, [for each 
),(}{ AFa = a
−k ,\ ABb∈ ,,)()( 11 Kab Θ≤Θ kk ab )()( Θ≤Θ ], and is 
efficient on 
a
B , then  ).(BFa∈
(WEI) is weaker than (EI) by restricting the applicability to the bargaining 
problems A and B with ).()( BmAm =   
 Axiom 3.13. Efficient Expansion Consistency (EEC): For each  B 
with , if 
∈BA,
BA⊆ A is symmetric, )(}{ AFa = and is efficient on then  a ,B ).(BFa =
Efficient Expansion Consistency requires that, given a symmetric problem 
A that has as the unique solution, ifa A is enlarged to B so that B  is a superset of 
A and if continues to be efficient ona B , then should still be the unique solution 
of
a
B .  
Pigou-Dalton Monotonicity 
Axiom 3.14. Pigou-Dalton Monotonicity (PDM): For each ∈A  B  
and , and every with Aa∈ nRx +∈ ,Ax∉ if Pigou-Dalton dominates then 
(i)  
x ,a
}).{()( xAFxAFa ∪∈⇒∈
(ii) while )(AFa∈ .}){()()(}{ φ≠∪∩⇒≠ xAFAFAFa  
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Axiom (PDM) requires that, if an alternative is Pigou-Dalton dominates an 
outcome of a bargaining problem, that alternative will be in the solution to the 
problem which is the combination of the original problem with that alternative. And if 
there are more than one outcomes in the solution to the original problem, the 
combined problem can not exclude all the outcomes from the original problem. The 
new problem will keep at least one outcome from the original problem. 
Axiom 3.15. Weak Pigou-Dalton Monotonicity I (WPDMI): For each ∈A  B 
and , and every with Aa∈ nRx +∈ ,Ax∉ if  Pigou-Dalton dominates then  x ,a
(i)  }).{()(}{ xAFxAFa ∪∈⇒∈
(ii) if }),{()( xAmmAmm ∪=  
[ but)(}{ AFa ∈ )](}{ AFa ≠ ⇒ ].}){()([ φ≠∪∩ xAFAF  
The first part of (WPDMI) is same as axiom (PDM) and requires that, if an 
alternative is Pigou-Dalton dominates a solution to a problem, that alternative will be 
a solution to the problem which is the combination of the original problem with that 
alternative. But the second part of monotonicity will be kept when the center point 
doesn’t change after the inclusion of the Pigou-Dalton dominant point. If the center 
point changes after the inclusion, that means the minimum utility increases in the 
Pigou-Dalton dominant alternative, so the Pigou-Dalton dominant alternative is 
superior to all the solutions of the original problem and maybe the unique solution to 
the new problem.  
 Axiom 3.16. Weak Pigou-Dalton Monotonicity II (WPDMII): For each 
∈A  B and , and every with Aa∈ nRx +∈ ,Ax∉ if  Pigou-Dalton dominates x
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,a then and if })],{()(}[{ xAFxAFa ∪∈⇒∈ ),,,0({}),0({ xammamm =  
[ but)(}{ AFa ∈ ].}){()([)](}{ φ≠∪∩⇒≠ xAFAFAFa   
(WPDMII) is similar to (WPDMI), and the first part is the same as (PDM), but 
the second part of monotonicity requires the minimum of the utility of Pigou-Dalton 
dominant point doesn’t exceed that of the solution to the original problem, thus the 
added Pigou-Dalton dominant alternative is not superior sufficiently to all the 
solutions of the original problem, and can not exclude all of them from the solution to 
the new problem. 
Other Properties 
Axiom 3.17. Exclusion (EX):  For every ∈BA,  B, if  then ),()( BmmAmm ≠
.)()( φ=∩ BFAF       
Exclusion requires that if the center points of two different problems are 
different, there is no common element in their solution.   
The center point of a problem contains of information about the problem. As 
illustrated in Figure 3-2, a low level of center point indicates that the problem either 
has very unequal distributions of utility (Figure 9) or the utility level is very low 
(Figure 10). If the center points of two problems are different, these two problems are 
considered to be too different to have common element in their solutions. 
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Figure 9. Center Point and Inequality 
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Figure 10. Center Point and Low Level of Utilities 
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Axiom 3.18. Replacement Independence (RI): For each ∈A B and , and 
every with if Pigou-Dalton dominates  for some b in A\ , if 
 then
Ab∈
nRx ++∈ ,Ax∉ x b )(AF
}),,,0({}),0({ xammamm = }).{)\(()( xbAFaAFa ∪∈⇒∈  
Replacement Independence requires that an alternative will still belong to the 
solution after a Pigou-Dalton Dominant point of any other alternative in the original 
problem replaces that alternative and such a replace does not go too far that the 
minimum utility that a player can get will not exceed the minimum utility in the 
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solution to the original problem. We consider such an alternative and the 
Pigou-Dalton domination of that alternative are similar to each other and the 
replacement does not change the outcome.  
Axiom 3.19. Hammond Equity (HE): For each ∈A B and 
every with and ,, nRyx +∈ Ax∈ ,Ay∉ if jjii xyyx ≤≤≤ with for all 
, then 
kk yx =
jik ,≠ }).{()( yAFyAFx ∪=⇒∈  
Hammond Equity was first introduced by Hammond (1976) in a social choice 
context. According to Hammond Equity, one alternative is considered to be more 
equal than another if the difference between two players becomes smaller while all the 
others’ are the same. An alternative is dominated by another alternative which is more 
equal. 
 
 CHAPTER 4.  
EXTENSIONS OF CLASSIC SOLUTIONS 
In this chapter we first define the various solutions which have been studied in 
convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. Specifically, we extend the 
Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to out 
finite problems. Then, we characterize these solutions respectively with the 
appropriate properties discussed in chapter III.  
Nash Solution 
Definition of Nash Solution 
Our definition of the Nash solution is the same as that in convex problems: 
alternatives that maximize the product of player’s utilities. Figure 11 illustrates the 
Nash solution in a 2-player bargaining problem. 
 
Figure 11. Nash Solution 
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The following definition is straightforward extensions of the Nash solution in 
standard convex and non-convex bargaining problems.  
Definition 4.1: Nash solution 
A bargaining solution  over B is the Nash solution if, for allF ∈A B, 
for all iNiiNi xaAaAF ∈∈ Π≥Π∈= |{)( }.Ax∈  
The above Nash solution is a standard extension of the Nash solution for both 
convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. Our notion of the Nash solution 
is similar to the one proposed by Kaneko (1980), Mariotti (1998), and Xu and 
Yoshihara (2006)  for non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems, and is 
identical to the Nash solution considered by Mariotti (1998) for finite bargaining 
problems. Other proposals of the Nash solution for non-convex problems include 
Conley and Wilkie (1991; 1996) and Zhou (1997), whose Nash extension solution is 
single-valued. But in our finite bargaining problems, the solution is not always 
single-valued.  
Characterization of Nash Solution 
Theorem 4. 1: Efficiency (E), Symmetry (S), Scale Invariance (SI), Contraction 
Invariance (CI) jointly uniquely determine the Nash solution. 
To prove Theorem 4.1, we first prove the following Lemma, Lemma1. 
Lemma 1: If a solution over B satisfies (E), (S) (CI), and (SI), then for every 
 
F
,, nRyx +∈
(L1): If , then 0>=∏∏ ∈∈ Ni iNi i yx ({0, , }) { , }F x y x y= . 
(L2): If , then ∏∏ ∈∈ > Ni iNi i yx ({0, , }) { }F x y x= . 
 
 31
Proof: Let a solution over B satisfies (E), (S) (CI), and (SI). Let  F ., nRyx +∈
Suppose first that 0>=∏∏ ∈∈ Ni iNi i yx . Noting that 0>=∏∏ ∈∈ Ni iNi i yx , 
it then follows that for all ,0>ix 0>iy .Ni∈ Define as follows: nR+∈α ,11 =α  
,1
2
1
2 αα y
x= ,K ,1
i
i
i y
x −=α ,K .11 −−= n
n
n
n y
x αα  Note that, for all ,Ni∈ iα is well 
defined and .0>iα  Therefore Furthermore, .nR ++∈α ,111
2
1
22 xxy
xy αα ===  
,2232
3
2
33 xyy
xy ααα == ,K ,1111 −−−− == nnnn
n
n
nn xyy
xy ααα and Noting that 
, ∏∏ ∈∈ = Ni iNi i yx ,
21
11
1
1
1
1
yyy
xxx
y
xxx
y
xx
nn
nn
n
n
nn
nn
n
n
nn K
KK
−
−
−
−
−
− ==== ααα we then 
have .111 yyxnn αα ==  Consider the permutation as follows: for 
and Then That is, 
0π 1)(0 += iiπ
1,,1 −= ni K .1)(0 =nπ .)(0 yx ααπ = xα is a permutation of .yα  
Let Note that }.},,,0{:)({ Π∈∈∈≡ + πααπ yxzRzA n A is symmetric and 
By (E) and (S), it must be true that .,, nRyx ++∈α }.0{\)( AAF = A straightforward 
application of (CI) gives }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF αααα = By (SI), we then obtain 
Therefore, (L1) is true.  }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF =
Suppose next that .∏∏ ∈∈ > Ni iNi i yx  Note that we must have 
 Consequently, 
,nRy +∈
.0≥∏∈Ni iy .0>∏∈Ni ix Let be such that 
Clearly, 
nR+∈ε
=+∏∈ )( iNi iy ε .∏∈Ni ix .yy >+ ε Consider bargaining problem 
}.,,,0{ ε+= yyxB Noting that and 0>x .yy >+ ε By (E), )(0 BF∉ and 
By (CI), ).(BFy∉ }).,,0({)( ε+= yxFBF  =+∏∈ )( iNi iy ε ∏∈Ni ix and (L1), 
}),,0({ ε+yxF = }.,{ ε+yx So ).,{}),,0({)( εε +=+= yxyxFBF  A 
straightforward application of (CI) yields }.{}),,0({ xyxF = Thus, (L2) is true.  
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With the help of Lemma 1, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It can be checked that the Nash solution satisfies (E), (S), 
(CI), and (SI). We therefore need to show that if a solution satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (SI), 
then it must be the Nash solution.  
Let a solution over B satisfies (E), (S), (CI) and (SI). Let F ∈A Б. We first 
note that there exists such that for all Aa∈ 0>ia .Ni∈ Consequently, 
 Let such that .0>∏∈Ni ia Ax∈ ≥∏∈Ni ix ∏∈Ni iy for all .Ay∈ For any 
such thatAy∈ <∏∈Ni iy ∏∈Ni ix , ).(AFy∉  For otherwise ),(AFy∈ , by (CI), 
a contradiction to (L2). Therefore, must contain at least one 
such that By (L1), for any 
},,,0({ yxFy∈ )(AF
Ax∈' =∏∈ 'Ni ix .∏∈Ni ix Az∈  such that 
must be in . Since, otherwise, if for some =∏∈Ni iz ,∏∈Ni ix z )(AF Az∈ with 
Then, by (CI), =∏∈Ni iz ,∏∈Ni ix ).(AFz∉ },'{},',0({ xzxF = a contradiction to 
(L1). That is, must be the Nash solution.  F
Mariotti (1998)  presents a similar characterization of the Nash solution for 
finite problems using (E), (CI), (SI) and Anonymity, Anonymity is as follows: 
Anonymity: For any A∈Б, )).(())(( AFAF ππ =  
Note that Anonymity is a stronger requirement than symmetry. 
Maximin Solution 
The Definitions of Maximin Solution 
In this part we discuss the Maximin solution. It is an extension of the Egalitarian 
solution in standard convex and non-convex bargaining problems to our finite 
problems. But we can see, in convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems, 
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the egalitarian solution is always single-valued but in our finite bargaining problems, 
the Maximin solution is often multi-valued. As illustrated in Figure 12, The Maximin 
solution to of this two-player bargaining problem is  }.,,,,{ edcba
 
Figure 12. Maiximin Solution and Leximin Solution 
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And the maximin solution is defined as: 
Definition 4.2: Maximin solution 
A bargaining solution F over B is the maximin solution if, for all ∈A B, 
 for all}{}{|{)( iNiiNi xMinaMinAaAF ∈∈ ≥∈= }Ax∈ }. 
Characterization of Maximin Solution 
Theorem 4.2 The Maximin solution is the unique solution satisfying (WE), (CI), 
(EI) and (D). 
To prove theorem 4.2, we first prove the following lemma, Lemma 2. 
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Lemma 2. If the solution over B satisfies (WE), (CI), (EC), and (D), then for 
every and 
F
,, nRyx +∈ ,021 >=== nxxx K  
(L3) if xy > and ,},,,min{ 121 xyyy n =K then }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF =  
(L4). If then },,,,min{ 211 nyyyx K> }.{}),,0({ xyxF =  
Proof. Let a solution over B satisfies (WE), (CI), (EC), and (D). 
Let and  
F
,, nRyx +∈ .021 >=== nxxx K  
(i). Suppose first that xy > and ,},,,min{ 121 xyyy n =K as illustrated in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Proof of L3 
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By (WE) and noting that  it must be true that By (EC) 
and noting that is symmetric, 
,0>>x }.{}),0({ xxF =
},0{ x }),,0({ yxFx∈ follows from that is weakly 
efficient on Noting that 
x
}.,,0{ yx xy > and }),,0({ yxFx∈ , a straightforward 
application of (D) and (WE) yields }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF = Thus, we have shown (L3). 
(ii). Next, suppose that  then, there exists such },,,,min{ 211 nyyyx K> nRz +∈
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that ,, xzyz >>> and  .},,,min{ 121 xzzz n =K As illustrated in Figure 14.  
Figure 14. Proof of L4. 
  
x1
x2
45o
x
z
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From (L3),  }.,{}),,0({ zxzxF = Consider the bargaining problem 
By (WE), clearly, neither nor is in  
If then by (CI), it would follow that 
}.,,,0{ zyx 0 y }).,,,0({ zyxF
}),,,,0({}{ zyxFz = }),,0{(}{ zxFz = which is 
contradiction with },{}),,0({ zxzxF = which was established a few lines above. Therefore, 
which, by (D), (WE) and noting that  }),,,,0({ zyxFx∈ ,xz > implies that  
}.,{}),,,0({ zxzyxF = Then by (CI), }.{}),,0({ xyxF = Therefore, (L6) is true.  
With Lemma 3, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.2. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. It can be checked that the maximin solution satisfies 
(WE), (CI), (EC) and (D). We need only to show that if a solution satisfies (WE), (CI), 
(EC) and (D), then it is the maximin solution.    
Let a solution over B satisfies (WE), (CI), (EC), and (D). Consider any finite F
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bargaining problem A from B. Let 
for all 
and 
},,,min{},,,min{|{* 2121 nn xxxaaaAaA KK ≥∈=
},Ax∈ },,,,{min* 21* nAa aaat K∈= *).,*,*,(* ttta K= Note that, there exists 
such that Hence, and therefore,    Aa∈ .0>>a 0* >t .0* >>a
Consider first that . If  .* Aa ∈ ),(* AFa ≠ then for some By 
(CI), it then would follow that  
).(, AFxAx ∈∈
*}).,,0({* axFa ≠ Note that, is such that 
The conclusion,
x
.},,,min{ *121 axxx n ≤K *}),,0({* axFa ≠ , would be in contradiction 
with either (L5) or (L6). Therefore, *}).,,0({* axFa ∈ By (D), (CI) and (L5), it then 
follows that On the other hand, if, for some ).(* AFA ⊆ ),(AFx∈ *,Ax∉ then by 
(CI), we would have *}.,{*}),,0({ axaxF = Note however, *,Ax∉ so 
By (L6), .},,,min{ *121 axxx n <K *}.{*}),,0({ aaxF = A contradiction. Therefore, 
 ).(* AFA =
Next, consider that .* Aa ∉ In this case, we consider the bargaining problem 
From above, we can show that *}.{aAB ∪= *}.{*)( aABF ∪= Then by 
(CI), follows easily. *)( AAF =
Leximin Solution 
Definition of Leximin Solution 
The Leximin solution maximizes the lexicographic minimum utility a player can 
get in a problem. As illustrated in Figure 12, the Leximin solution to the problem is 
 }.{c
Definition 4.4: Leximin solution 
A bargaining solution F over B is the leximin solution if, for all ∈A B, 
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xaAaAF lexi min|{)( ≥∈= for all }.Ax∈  
Recall that is defined in definition 2.2.1. minlexi≥
Characterization of Leximin Solution 
Theorem 4.4. The Leximin solution is the unique solution satisfying (E), (CI), 
(S) and (EI). 
We use the following lemma, lemma 3, to prove Theorem 4.4. 
Lemma 3. If the solution over B satisfies (E), (CI), (S), and (EI), then for 
every with  
F
,, nRyx +∈ ,0,0 >>> yx
(L5) if then ,min yx lexi= };,{})0,,({ yxyxF =  
(L6) if then ,min yx lexi> }.{})0,,({ xyxF =  
Proof: Let the solution over B satisfies (E), (CI), (S), and (EI). Let 
with  
F
,, nRyx +∈ .0,0 >>> yx
Consider first that then must be a permutation of Let 
By (E), 
,min yx lexi= x .y
}.},,,0{:)({ Π∈∈∈≡ + ππ yxzRzA n ).(0 AF∉ Then, follows 
from (S) easily. By (CI), it then follows that 
}0{\)( AAF =
};,{})0,,({ yxyxF = Thus, (L5) is 
proved.  
Consider next that  Then for some ,min yx lexi> },,,2,1{ nk K∈  
.)()(,)()(,,)()(( 1111 kkkk yxyxyx Θ>ΘΘ=ΘΘ=Θ −−K  Let be such that nRa +∈
.)(,)(,,)(,)( 1112211 knkkkk xaaaxaxaxa Θ====Θ=Θ=Θ= +−− LK Note that is 
symmetric and By (E), 
a
−k .0>>a }.{}),0({ aaF = Noting that is symmetric 
and 
a −k
,)()(,)(,,)(,)( 112211 kkkkk yxayayaya Θ>Θ=Θ=Θ=Θ= −−K by (EI) we 
obtain We shall show that }).,,0({ yaFa∈ }).,,0({ yaFa =  Suppose to the contrary 
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that Given that }).,,0({ yaFa ≠ }),,,0({ yaFa∈ we have by (E). 
Recall that
}),,0({},{ yaFya ∈
,)()(,)(,,)(,)( 112211 kkkkk yxayayaya Θ>Θ=Θ=Θ=Θ= −−K there exists 
such that nRz +∈ .)(,,,, 1112211 kkkkkkk azzzyazazaz <===<Θ=== +−− KK As 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. Note that is z −k symmetric, and  By (E) and (EI), 
 
.0>>z
}).,,0({ yzFz∈
 
Figure 15. Proof of L6 
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Now we consider the bargaining problem   :},,,0{ zya
(i) Note that by (E) it must be the case that ,az < }.,,,0({,0 zyaFz∉  
(ii) If by (CI) we can get },{}),,,0({ azyaF = }),,0({}{ yaFa = a contradiction 
to our assumption }).,,0({ yaFa ≠   
(iii) If by (CI), it follows that },,{}),,,0({ yazyaF = }),,0({}{ yzFy = , a 
contradiction to the previous conclusion }).,,0({ yzFz∈  
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Form (i), (ii) and (iii), consequently, ,},,,0({ φ=zyaF a contradiction with the 
non-emptiness of a solution. Therefore, }).,,0({ yaFa =  
If ,ax = then we get L(6) directly }.{})0,,({ xyxF =  
If we consider the bargaining problem Note that 
and A straightforward application of (CI) and (E) implies 
that By (CI) again, 
,ax ≠ }.,,,0{ yxa
0>> ax }).,,0({}{ yaFa =
}).,,,0({}{ yxaFx = }.{})0,,({ xyxF = Again we get L(6). 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. It can be checked that the leximin solution satisfies (E), 
(CI), (S) and (EI). In what follows, we show that if a solution satisfies (E), (CI), (S) 
and (EI), then it must be the leximin solution.  
Let the solution over B satisfies (E), (CI), (S), and (EI). Take any F ∈A B. Let 
for all xaAaA lexi min|{* ≥∈= }.Ax∈ We need to show that We note 
that, for all Let 
.*)( AAF =
*,, Aba ∈ .min ba lexi= .** Aa ∈ If, for some )(, AFxAx ∈∈ but 
then, by (CI), a contradiction with (L6) since  
Therefore,  Next a straightforward application of (CI) and (L5), 
 follows immediately. 
*,Ax∉ }),*,,0({ xaFx∈ .* min xa lexi=
.*)( AAF ⊆
*)( AAF =
Maxiproportionalmin Solution 
Definition of Maxiproportionalmin Solution 
In this part we study another series of classic solutions in finite bargaining 
problem. Kalai and Smorodinsky(1975) came up with their solution which is 
monotone to the feasible set while it does not satisfy the property of contraction 
independence. In our finite bargaining problem, the counterpart of Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution is Maxiproportionalmin solution defined below.  Its lexicographic version is 
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to be called the Lexiproportinalmin solution which is to be defined in Chapter 4.5. 
 
Figure 16. Maxiproportionalmin Solution and Leximinproportionalmin Solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x1
x2
a
b
c
d
m(A)
 
 
Definition 4.4. Maxiproportionalmin Solution: A bargaining solution over B 
is the maxiproportionalmin solution if, for all 
F
∈A B, 
}
)(
{min}
)(
{min|{)(
Am
x
Am
aAaAF
i
i
Ni
i
i
Ni ∈∈ ≥∈= for all }.Ax∈  
As illustrated in Figure 16, the Maxiproportionalmin solution to the problem is 
 },,,{)( dcbaAF =
Here we give the definition of the Lexiproportionalmin solution which we will 
discuss further in next section and we can easily see the difference between these two 
solutions as illustrated in Figure 16. 
Definition 4.5. Lexiproportionalmin Solution: A bargaining solution over B 
is the Lexiproportionalmin solution if, for all 
F
∈A B, 
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)(
,,
)(
,
)(
(}
)(
,,
)(
,
)(
(|{)(
2
2
1
1
min
2
2
1
1
Am
x
Am
x
Am
x
Am
a
Am
a
Am
aAaAF
n
n
lexi
n
n KK ≥∈= for all 
 }.Ax∈
As illustrated in Figure 16, Lexiproportionalmin solution of the problem is 
 }.{)( cAF =
The Maxiproportionalmin (see also Nagahisa and Tanaka (2002)  where they call 
it the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for finite bargaining problems) and 
Lexiproportionalmin solutions can, respectively, be regarded as extensions of the 
Kalai-Smordinsky and the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions in standard 
bargaining problems. These two solutions are sensitive to changes in the set of 
feasible outcomes in a way which the Nash solutions are not. In particular, 
Maxiproportionalmin and Lexiproportionalmin are sensitive to the ideal point of a 
bargaining problem. So any change that results in the change of the ideal point will 
alter the solutions.  
Characterization of Maxiproportionalmin Solution 
Theorem 4.4. The Maxiproportionalmin solution is the unique solution 
satisfying (SI), (WE), (WCI), (REC) and (D). 
Proof: The necessity of the axioms of theorem 4.4 can be readily checked. To 
prove the sufficiency part of the theorem, let be the solution over B satisfying (SI), 
(WE), (WCI), (REC) and (D). Let 
F
∈A B, Note that for all  
Construct the problem 
0)( >Ami .Ni∈
AB α≡ where ).
)(
1,,
)(
1,
)(
1(
21 AmAmAm n
K=α Then 
Let denote the maxiproportionalmin solution and the ).1,,1,1()( K=Bm *F minmax iF
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maximin solution. Then, =)(* BF ).(minmax BF i In what follows, we shall show that 
 ).()( minmax BFBF i=
Let and BbRbC n ∈∈= + :)({π }.Π∈π Clearly )1,,1,1()()( K== BmCm and 
is symmetric, and Consider such that C ).()( minmaxminmax CFBF ii ⊆ nRa +∈
}.:},,,max{min{ 2121 Bxxxxaaa nn ∈==== KK Note that For each 
let be such that and for all  
.0>>a
,Ni∈ ),,,( 21 iniii bbbb K= 1abii = 1=ijb }.{\ jNj∈
Construct the bargaining problem From the 
construction, is symmetric and 
}.,,,,{ 21 nbbbaCS K∪≡
S ).1,,1,1()()()( K=== BmCmSm  
By (WE), Note that and are both symmetric, 
and is weakly efficient on by (REC), it follows that 
}.{}),0({ aaF = ,},0{ Sa ⊆ },0{ a S
a ,S ).(SFa∈ Note that, for 
every it must be true that or ),(minmax SFx i∈ ax > .ax = By (D), we obtain that 
  ).()(minmax SFSF i ⊆
To show that we note that, for any but 
from the construction of , there exists 
),()(minmax SFSF i = ),(minmax SFx i∉
,Sx∈ S Ni∈ such that By (WE), it 
then follows that Therefore,  
.xbi >>
).(SFx∉ ).()(minmax SFSF i =
Note that ,SB ⊆ )()( BmSm = and 
 By (WCI), it follows that 
 A straightforward application of (SI) yields that 
 
.)()()( minmaxminmax φ≠=∩=∩ BFSFBSFB ii
).()( minmax BFBF i=
).(*)( AFAF =
In characterizing the maxiproportionalmin solution (what they call the extension 
of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to finite bargaining problem), Nagahisa and 
Tanaka (2002) use (SI), (S), (WCI), Monotonicity and Continuity. Monotonicity 
 
 43
requires that, for every ∈BA, Б with )()( BmAm = and if, for some 
and every  “ is strictly higher than the minimal level of the utilities the 
solution gives to the player under 
,BA ⊆
Bb∈ ,Ni∈ ib
F i B is strictly higher than that under ”. 
Continuity requires that any small change in the problem will not lead to large 
changes in solution outcomes, It is then clear that our axiomatic characterization of 
the maxiproportionalmin is different from that of Nagahisa and tanaka (2002): in our 
characterization result, we focus on expansion consistency type properties of the 
solution, while they focus on monotonicity and continuity aspects of the solution.  
.A
Lexiproportionalmin Solution 
Definition of Lexiproportionalmin solution 
See definition 4.5. in previous section. 
Characterization of Lexiproportionalmin Solution 
Theorem 4.5. The Lexiproportionalmin solution is the unique solution 
satisfying (SI), (E), (S), (WCI), (WEI) and (IR). 
Proof: The necessity of the axioms of Theorem 4.5 can be readily checked. To 
prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5, let be a solution over B satisfying (SI), 
(E), (S), (WCI), (WEI) and (IR). Let 
F
∈A B. Not that  for all 
Construct 
0)( >Ami
.Ni∈ AB α≡ where ).
)(
1,,
)(
1,
)(
1(
21 AmAmAm n
K=α Then 
Let denote the lexiproportionalmin solution and the 
leximin solution. Then, 
).1,,1,1()( K=Bm *F minlexiF
=)(* BF ).(min BF lexi   In what follows, we shall show that 
 ).()( minmax BFBF i=
We first show that  ).(},:{)( minmin BFByyxBxBF
lexi
lexi =∈≥∈⊆
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Let be such that for all Bx ∈* yx lexi min* ≥ .By∈ Consider any Bz∈ such 
that  That is, for some ;* min zx lexi≥ },,,2,1{ nk K∈  
.)(*)(,)(*)(,,)(*)(( 1111 kkkk zxzxzx Θ>ΘΘ=ΘΘ=Θ −−K Consider be such 
that 
nRa +∈
.)(,)(,,)(,)( 1112211 knkkkk xaaaxaxaxa Θ====Θ=Θ=Θ= +−− LK Note that 
is symmetric and  For each a −k .0>>a ,Ni∈ let be such that 
and for all  
),,,( 21
i
n
iii ssss K=
1=iis 0=ijb }.{\ jNj∈
Construct the bargaining problem Note that U Ni isaC ∈∪= }.{},0{
).1,,1,1()()( K== BmCm  By (IR), ,0>>a }.{)( aCF =  
Consider the bargaining problem }.{zCD ∪= Note that ),()( CmDm = a is 
symmetric, −k ,)(,,)(,)( 112211 −− Θ=Θ=Θ= kk zazaza K and is efficient on 
By (WEI), it follows that 
a
.D ).(DFa∈ By using a similar argument as in the proof of 
(L8), we can show that Consider the bargaining problem Noting 
that 
).(DFa = .DB∪
)1,,1,1()()()( K===∪ BmDmDBm and that ).(DFz∉= By (WCI), it then 
follows that ).( DBFz ∪∉= Again by (WCI), ).(BFz∉=  
Therefore,  ).(},:{)( minmin BFByyxBxBF
lexi
lexi =∈≥∈⊆
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.5, we need to show that 
 ).()( min BFBF lexi⊇
Given the non-emptiness of and without loss of generality, let 
Consider the bargaining problem  Note that 
)(BF
).(* BFx ∈ .)(U Π∈= π π BG
)1,,1,1()()( K== BmGm and that  is symmetric. Let G ).(GFy∈  Then by (S), 
)()( GFy ∈π for all .Π∈π By the construction, for some )(* yπ , it must be 
that .)(* By ∈π  By (WCI), it then follows that ).()(* BFy ∈π  
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If it is a contradiction with Therefore, for each 
it must be true that By (S), Then, 
follows from (WCI) immediately. 
,* min yx lexi> ).()( min BFBF lexi⊆
),(GFy∈ ).()(* min BFy lexi∈π ).()(min GFBF lexi ⊆
)()( min BFBF lexi=
To summarize, we have shown that . By (SI), 
 
)()( min BFBF lexi=
).(*)( AFAF =
The Independence of Axioms in Lexiproportionalmin Solution 
The characterizing axioms in theorem 4.5 are more complicated than other 
axioms used to characterize other five solutions. Our next result shows that the 
axioms in Theorem 4.5 are independent.  . 
Theorem 4.6. The axioms in theorem 4.5 are independent.  
Proof: Define the solution over B as follows: 654321 ,,,,, FFFFFF
1. (Leximax Proportional solution) A bargaining solution is defined over B:  
for all 
 
1F
))(/(),(/())(/(),(/(|{)( 11max11
1 AmxAmxAmaAmaAaAF nnlexinn KK ≥∈=
}.Ax∈
yx lexi max≥ if and only if ),[( yx nn Θ>Θ or ))(),(( 11 yxyx nnnn −− Θ>ΘΘ=Θ or 
, or K ))(),(),(( 1122 yxyxyx nn Θ>ΘΘ=ΘΘ=Θ K . 
2. is leximin solution defined in definition 4.3. 2F
3. is maxiproportionalmin solution defined in definition 4.4. 3F
4. We define as follows: we put some priority on lexiproportionalmin 
solution, such as:  lexiproportionalmin solution with  or 
 lexiproportionalmin solution if no in lexiproportionalmin solution such 
that  
4F
⊂)(AF )()( 21 AFAF ≥
=)(AF x
.21 xx ≥
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5. is efficient in aAaAF (|{)(5 ∈= A and  }.0>>a
6. is Nash solution defined in definition 4.1. 6F
Then we can check that: 
1.  satisfies (SI), (E), (S), (WCI), (WEI) but not (IR).   1F
2.  satisfies (IR), (E), (S), (WCI), (WEI) but not (SI).  2F
3.  satisfies (SI), (IR), (S), (WCI), (WEI) but not (E).  3F
4.  satisfies (SI), (E), (IR), (WCI), (WEI) but not (S).  4F
5.  satisfies (SI), (E), (S), (IR), (WEI) but not (WCI).  5F
6.  satisfies (SI), (E), (S), (WCI), (IR) but not (WEI).  6F
From the discussion above we can see, the axioms used to characterize 
lexiproportinalmin solution are independent with each other and not redundant. 
These examples prove Theorem 4.6.  
 
 CHAPTER 5.  
MAXIMIN AND UTILITARIAN 
In this chapter we study the utilitarian solution and other two new solutions 
which combine the utilitarian solution and maximin solution in different ways.   
Utilitarian and Maximin 
The utilitarian solution of a bargaining problem selects all those alternatives that 
have the greatest sum of utilities.  The utilitarian principle has a long tradition in 
moral philosophy and in economics (see, for example,  Bentham (1907) and 
Harsanyi (1955; 1975)).  
The Maximin solution of the bargaining problem, as we have studied in chapter 
4, consists of all those alternatives at which minimum utility levels are the greatest.  
This solution was inspired by Rawls (1971; 1974) in his discussion of a theory of 
justice. 
Compared with the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, as 
Shapley (1969)  has pointed out, these two solutions both indicate interpersonal 
comparisons of utilities. In the case of the utilitarian solution, utilities are cardinally 
comparable, and in the case of the maximin solution, utilities are ordinally 
comparable.  
The utilitarian solution is often criticized that it does not take into account how 
utilities are distributed among the players.  It also treats utility gains by one player 
 47
 48
no different from the same amount of utility gains by another player regardless of  
the status of the players. On the other hand, the maximin solution puts priority to the 
most unfortunate player (measured in terms of utility levels), while the utility increase 
of the player who is not the most unfortunate player would not change the outcome of 
the bargaining. 
As we can see, the utilitarian solution and the maximin solution are two 
extremes: the utilitarian solution is less concerned with the distribution issue while the 
maximin solution takes the distribution issue to an extreme by focusing on the 
worst-off player in the game. In this Chapter, we first present a characterization for 
the utilitarian solution, and then consider two solutions each of which combines the 
maximin solution and the utilitarian solution in a particular way, and give axiomatic 
characterization for both. 
Definitions 
So far the bargaining problems we have studied are the ones that contain at least 
one element such that every player’s utility is strictly greater than the disagreement 
point = 0. The other kind of bargaining problems such as, with is 
trivial problems for the solutions we have studied in previous section. But the 
utilitarian solution to this kind of the problems is well defined, so are the 
Maximin-Utilitarian and Utilitarian-Maximin solutions we will define next. So in this 
chapter, we extend our bargaining problems to include those that do not contain 
elements such that every player’s utility is strictly greater than the disagreement point. 
Here we enlarge the family of all finite bargaining problem B we defined in Chapter 2 
d },0{ a )1,0(=a
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to B* { φ≠∩∈⊆= ++ nn RAARA ,0 and }∞<≤ A#2 . 
 
Definition of Utilitarian Solution 
The utilitarian solution to a bargaining problem lies on the Pareto-efficient 
frontier of the problem. Compared with the Nash solution which maximizes the 
product of player’s utilities, the utilitarian maximizes the sum of players’ utilities.  
Figure 17 illustrates the utilitarian solution in a 2-player problem.  
Definition 5.1: Utilitarian Solution 
A bargaining solution  over B* is the utilitarian solution if, for all F ∈A  B*, 
iNiiNi
xaAaAF ∈∈ ∑∑ ≥∈= |{)( for all }.Ax∈  
 
Figure 17. Utilitarian Solution 
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Definition of Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
The Maximin-Utilitarian solution first narrows down the problem to the 
maximin set of the problem, then from the maximin set of the problem we choose the 
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alternatives which maximize the sum of the utilities. Consider a problem  as 
illustrated in Figure 5-2 below.  The solution to A is given by  
.A
}.{)( cAF =
Definition 5.2: Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
A bargaining solution  over B* is the Maximin-utilitarian solution if, for all F
∈A B*, iNiiNii xaAFaAF ∈∈ ∑∑ ≥∈= |)({)( minmax for all  
Where is the maximin solution of the problem. 
}.minmax AFx i∈
minmax iF
 
Figure 18. Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
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In a two-player bargaining problem, Maximin-Utilitarian solution is the same as 
the Leximin solution. However, they are different in the general player 
bargaining problems. For example, for the bargaining problem in which 
 
−> )2(nn
},,,0{ baA =
),3,2,1(=a ),4,5.1,1(=b according to the Leximin solution, while 
according to Maximin-Utilitarian solution,  
},{)(min aAF lexi =
}.{)( bAF um =−
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Definition of Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
The Utilitarian-Maximin solution, which is different from the 
Maximin-Utilitarian solution, selects utility vectors from a problem that are the 
“maximins” of those maximizing the sum of utilities in the problem. 
 Figure 19 illustrates the Utilitarian-Maximin solution. In the bargaining 
problem of the figure 19, the utilitarian-maximin solution is given by  }.{)( bAF =
Definition 5.3: Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
A bargaining solution  over B* is the Utilitarian-Maximin solution if, for all F
∈A B*, for all 
where is the utilitarian solution of the problem. 
iNiiNi
nutilitaria xMinaMinAFaAF ∈∈ ≥∈= |)({)(
)},(AFx Utilitaian∈ nutilitariaF
 
Figure 19. Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
 
 
  
 
         
 
          
x1
x2
45o
a
b
  
 
 52
 
Characterization 
Characterization of Utilitarian Solution 
Theorem 5.1. The utilitarian solution is the unique solution satisfying (E), (S), 
(CI) and (PDM). 
To establish theorem 5.1, we first prove the following lemma, lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. If a solution over B* satisfies (E), (S), (CI) and (PDM), then for 
every distinct   
F
,, nRyx +∈
(L7). if ,11 nn yyxx ++=++ KK then }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF =  
(L8). if ,11 nn yyxx ++>++ KK then }.{}),,0({ xyxF =  
Proof. Let a solution over B* satisfies (E), (S), (CI) and (PDM), Let 
be distinct.  
F
nRyx +∈,
Consider first that .11 tyyxx nn =++=++ KK  Note that .Let 0>t
).,,(*
n
t
n
ta K=  If then there exists a positive integer and 
such that 
*,ax = ,p
np Rxx +∈,,1 K x Pigou-Dalton dominates  Pigou-Dalton dominates 
 Pigou-Dalton dominates Let By 
(E) and (CI), we have 
,1x 1x
,2x ,K px .y }.},,0{:)({ Π∈∈∈≡ + ππ yzRzA n
)}(,{)})(,,0({ yyyyF ππ = for any Π∈π . Consider the 
bargaining problem Note that Pigou-Dalton dominates it 
then follows that  Note that  
}.),(,,0{ pxyyB π= px ,y
).(BFx p ∈ )})(,,0({}{ yyFy π∈ so 
)}).(,,0({}{ yyFy π≠ By (PDM), .)})(,,0({)( φπ ≠∩ yyFBF  By (CI) it follows 
that ).()}(,{ BFyy ⊂π And with we then have By 
employing the same argument, we can show that 
By (CI), it then follows 
)(BFx p ∈ ).(}),(,{ BFxyy p ⊆π
=}).,,),(,,,0({ 21 pxxxyyxF Kπ }..,,),(,,{ 21 pxxxyyx Kπ
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that  }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF =
If  we can get the same result.  *,ay =
If and , by following a similar argument as above, we can show 
that By (CI), it follows that Thus 
we get (L7). 
*ax ≠ *ay ≠
*}.,,{*}),,,0({ ayxayxF = }.,{}),,0({ yxyxF =
Next, consider that ,11 nn yyxx ++>++ KK Note that, there exists a such 
that  and By (E), 
nRz +∈
nn zzxx ++=++ KK 11 .yz > }).,,,0({ zyxFy∉ Note that 
Then contains either or or both. From (L7) and 
by (CI), it then follows that 
}).,,,0({0 zyxF∉ }),,,0({ zyxF x z
}).,,,0({},{ zyxFzx = Therefore, by (CI), 
This proves (L8). }.{}),,0({ xyxF =
Proof of Theorem 5.1 It can be checked that the axioms of theorem 5.1 are 
necessary for the utilitarian solution. We therefore show that if a solution satisfies the 
axioms of theorem 5.1, it must be the utilitarian solution.  
Let over B* satisfies (E), (S), (CI) and (PDM). Take any F ∈A B. Let 
nn xxxaaaAaA +++≥+++∈= KK 2121|{* for all }.Ax∈  Let and let 
We show that 
** Aa ∈
.21 taaa n =+++ K .*)( AAF = If, for some Ax∈ with 
then by (CI), we would have ,21 txxx n <+++ K ),(AFx∈ *}),,,0({ axFx∈ a 
contradiction with (L4). Therefore, A straightforward application of (L3) 
and (CI) then gives us the desired result, 
.*)( AAF ⊆
.*)( AAF =  
Characterization of Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
Theorem 5.2. The Maximin-Utilitarian solution is uniquely determined by (E), 
(S), (CI), (SEC), (WPDMI). 
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In order to prove theorem 5.2, first we prove Lemma 5. 
Lemma 5. If a solution over B* satisfies (E), (CI), then for everyF ∈A  B*, 
if ,nRx +∈ ),(}{ AFa = ax > then }).{(}{ xAFx ∪=  
Proof of Lemma 5: Let over B* satisfy (E) and (CI).  Let F ∈A B*, 
and with . By (E), ,nRx +∈ ),(}{ AFa = ax > }).{( xAFa ∪∉ For any Az∈ and 
,az ≠  if  }),{( xAFz ∪∈  by (CI), we will get that: ),(AFz∈  so 
 By the non-emptiness of the solution, }).{( xAFz ∪∉ }).{(}{ xAFx ∪=  
Proof of Theorem 5.2: It can be checked that the Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
satisfies (E), (S), (WPDMI), (SEC), (CI). We therefore need to show that if a solution 
satisfies (E), (S), (WPDMI), (SEC), (CI), then it must be the Maximin-Utilitarian 
Solution. 
Let a solution over B* satisfy (E), (S), (WPDMI), (SEC), (CI). First we show 
that for any 
F
∈A B*,  ).()( minmax AFAF i⊆
First consider the problem  By (E), 
 Notice is efficient in 
).()](\[ minmax AmmAFAB i ∪=
)}.(,0{)( AmmFAmm = )(Amm B and is 
symmetric, by (EEC), 
)}(,0{ Amm
).()( BFAmm =  That means, for any other point Bz∈ , that 
is, that also means)},({\ AmmBz∈ ),(minmax AFz i∉ ).(BFz∉ Note that 
then by (CI), ),(AmmAB ∪⊆ ))(( AmmAFz ∪∉  for any  ),(minmax AFz i∉
Then if  
(i). then ,)( AAmm ∈ ,)( AAmmA =∪ it follows )(AFz∉  for 
any  ),(minmax AFz i∉
(ii) then there must be some ,)( AAmm ∉ Ab∈ such as for some )(Ammb ii =
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Ni∈ and  for other )(Ammb jj > .ij ≠ That is, but not  )(Ammb > ).(Ammb >>
By Lemma 5 we get .}){{ bbBF =∪ Then by (CI), .}){)](/([{ bbAmmBF =∪  
That is, for any Noting that 
then we can get
}){)](/({[ bAmmBFz ∪∉ ),(minmax AFz i∉
,}]{)](/[ AbAmmB ⊂∪ )(AFz∉ for any  ),(minmax AFz i∉
From (i) and (ii), we get the result that if  then that 
means,  
),(minmax AFz i∉ ).(AFz∉
).()( minmax AFAF i⊆
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, and noting that during the 
same time the center point of the problems remains unchanged, we can show that 
is the utilitarian solution in . )(AF )(minmax AF i
Characterization of Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
Theorem 5.3: The Utilitarian-Maximin solution is uniquely determined by (E), 
(S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX) and (RI). 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. It can be checked that the Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
(E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX), (RI). We therefore need to show that if a solution 
satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX) and (RI), then it must be the 
Utilitarian-Maximin Solution. 
Let a solution satisfy (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX) and (RI). F
Step 1. We show that that is, if there exist such 
that then 
),()( AFAF nutilitaria⊆ ,, Ayx ∈
,11 nn yyxx ++<++ KK ).(AFx∉  
Suppose to the contrary that for some in x A  such that and there 
is with
),(AFx∈
,Ay∈ .11 syytxx nn =++<=++ KK Then, consider such that ,a
.21 n
taaa n ==== K  We can check that either xa =  or a Pigou-Dalton 
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dominates ,x then By (WPDMII),  
}).{( aAFa ∪∈  (*).  
(i) If noting that ,min iiNi ay ≥∈ naaa === K21 and 
we can get that By (E), ,∑∑ ∈∈ > Ni iNi i ay .ay > }).{( aAFa ∪∉  a contradiction to 
(*). In this case, we get the conclusion that ).(AFx∉  
(ii) If  noting that ,min iiNi ay <∈ naaa === K21 and 
there exists such that ,∑∑ ∈∈ > Ni iNi i ay ,nRz +∈ ,∑∑ ∈∈ = Ni iNi i yz and for some 
,0 Nk << ,)()()( 21 ik axzz =Θ==Θ=Θ K .)( 1 ik az >Θ + And note that 
Pigou-Dalton dominates and z y }).,,0({}),0({ zammamm =  Then by RI, 
 But  a contradiction with (E). )./}]{}{([ yzaAFa ∪∪∈ ,az >
Therefore if if ,, Ayx ∈ ,11 nn yyxx ++<++ KK then ).(AFx∉  That is, 
 ).()( AFAF nutilitaria⊆
Step 2. We prove that for all if then 
  
),(, AFyx nutilitaria∈ ,minmin iNiiNi yx ∈∈ <
).(AFx∉
Consider the problem },,,0{ yxB = in which ,11 nn yyxx ++=++ KK and 
 By (E), it must be true that  If and 
noting that we have 
.minmin iNiiNi yx ∈∈ < }.,{)( yxBF ⊆ ),(}{ BFx ⊆
}),,0({ xFx = }).,0({)(}{ xFBFx ∩=  Note that 
From )}.,0({)( xmmBmm ≠ ,minmin iNiiNi yx ∈∈ < it follows that 
,}),0({)( φ=∩ xFBF a contradiction. So we get ).(BFx∉ By (CI),  ).(AFx∉
Step 3. We prove that  over B* is the Utilitarian-Maximin solution. F
Form (step 1) and (step 2) we get that 
 for all  By the same ⊆)(AF iNiiNinutilitaria xMinaMinAFa ∈∈ ≥∈ |)({ }.AFx Utilitaian∈
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reasoning as in the proof of theorem 5.1, we can get the conclusion that the 
Utilitarian-Maximin solution is uniquely determined by (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), 
(EX) and (RI). 
The Independence Property of the Axioms 
In this section, we show that there is no superfluous axiom in the 
characterization of the Utilitarian, Maximin-Utilitarian and Utilitarian-Maximin 
solutions.  
The Independence of the Axioms in Utilitarian Solution 
Theorem 5.4. The axioms used in theorem 5.1, (E), (S), (CI), (PDM) are 
independent. 
We will use the same notation to define the alternative solutions as in theorem 
4.6 in the following proofs.  
Proof: Define the solution over Б as follows: 4321 ,,, FFFF
1. A bargaining solution is defined over B*:  for all 1F }0{)(1 =AF ∈A  B*. 
That is, always chooses the disagreement point of any problem. 1F
2. is defined over B* as follows: for all 2F ∈A  B*. 
)()(2 AFAF nUtilitaria= if  )};,0,,0,0{()( lAF nUtilitaria K=
)},,0,0/{())(()(2 lAFAF nUtilitaria K= if  )}.,0,,0,0{()( lAF nUtilitaria K≠
3. is defined over B* as: for all 3F ∈A  B*, 
|)({)(3 AFxAF nUtilitaria∈= there is no Ay∈ such that is Pigou-Dalton 
dominated by or there is 
x
y Az∈ such that ),(zx π= for some .}.Π∈π  
4. is defined as as the Nash solution. 4F
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Then we can check following:  
1.  satisfies (S), (CI),(PDM) but violates (E). 1F
2.  says, if there is a point which is on the last axis, and it also belongs to 
the utilitarian solution, if the utilitarian solution only contains this point, we will 
choose this point. If the utilitarian solution of the problem includes other points than 
this one, we will choose all other points in the utilitarian solution of the problem 
excluding this point. This solution does not satisfy the symmetry axiom and it is also 
easy to check that this solution satisfies (E), (CI).  
2F
Now we check for (PDM). In the first condition,  
 satisfies (PDM). In the second condition, 
If then 
satisfies (PDM). If but we can see 
there is no such that PDM So 
does not violate (PDM).  
),()(2 AFAF nUtilitaria=
)()(2 AFAF nUtilitaria=
)}.,0,,0,0{()( lAF nUtilitaria K≠ ),(),0,,0,0( AFl nutilitaria∉K
))(()(2 AFAF nUtilitaria= ),(),0,,0,0( AFl nutilitaria∈K
)(AFx nutilitaria∈ ),0,,0,0( lK .x
)(),0,,0,0( 2 AFl ∉K
From above we can get, satisfies (E), (CI), (WPD) but violates (S). 2F
3. For any problem ∈A  B*, and if there is such that is 
Pigou-Dalton dominated by and there is 
)(AFx nUtilitaria∈ Ay∈ x
y Az∈ such that ),(zx π= .Π∈π If is 
the only symmetric point of and we delete from the problem 
y
x y A and is not in 
the solution to the new contracted problem. So  satisfies (E), (S), (PDM) but 
violates (CI). 
x
3F
4.  satisfies (E), (S), (CI), but violates (PDM). 4F
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The Independence of the Axioms in Maximin-Utilitarian Solution 
Theorem 5.5. The axioms used in theorem 5.2, (E), (S), (CI), (SEC), (WPDMI), 
are independent. 
Proof: Define the solution over Б as follows: 54321 ,,,, FFFFF
1. A bargaining solution is defined as the Maximin solution over B*.  1F
2. is defined over B as: for all 2F ∈A  B*. 
)()(2 AFAF UM −= if  )};,0,,0,0{()( lAF UM K=−
)},,0,0/{())(()(2 lAFAF UM K−= if  )}.,0,,0,0{()( lAF UM K≠−
There is the Maximin-Utilitarian solution defined in definition 5.2. UMF −
3. is defined over B* as: for all 3F ∈A  B*,  
|)({)(3 AFxAF UM −∈= there is no Ay∈ such that is Pigou-Dalton 
dominated by or there is 
x
y Ay∈ such that ),(yx π= .}.Π∈π  
4. We define as the Utilitarian solution in definition 5.1. 4F
5. We define as the Leximin solution in definition 4.4. 5F
Then we can check: 
1.  satisfies (S), (CI),(SEC), (WPDMI) but violates (E). 1F
2.  satisfies (E), (CI), (SEC), (WPDMI( but violates (S). 2F
3.  satisfies (E), (S), (SEC), (WPDMI) but violates (CI). 3F
4.  satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMI) but violates (SEC). 4F
5. satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (SEC) but violates (WPDMI). 5F
The Independence of Axioms in Utilitarian-Maximin Solution 
Theorem 5.6. The axioms used in theorem 5.3, (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX) 
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and (RI) are independent with.  
1. A bargaining solution is defined as the Maximin solution over B*.  1F
2. is defined over B* as: for all 2F ∈A  B*. 
)()(2 AFAF MU −= if  )};,0,,0,0{()( lAF MU K=−
)},,0,0/{())(()(2 lAFAF MU K−= if  )}.,0,,0,0{()( lAF MU K≠−
There is the Utilitarian-Maximin solution defined in definition 5.3. MUF −
3. is defined over B* as: for all 3F ∈A  B*, 
|)({)(3 AFxAF MU −∈= there is no Ay∈ such that is Pigou-Dalton 
dominated by or there is 
x
y Ay∈ such that ),(yx π= .}.Π∈π  
4. (Utilitarian-Leximin solution). A bargaining solution  over B* is the 
Utilitarian-Maximin solution if, for all 
4F
∈A  B*, for 
all In which is the utilitarian solution of the problem. 
xaAFaAF nutilitaria ≥∈= |)({)(
)}.(AFx Utilitaian∈ nutilitariaF
5. We define as the Utilitarian solution in definition 5.1. 5F
6 We define as the Maximin-Utilitarian solution in definition 5.2. 5F
Then we can check: 
1.  satisfies (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX), (RI) but violates (E).  1F
2.  satisfies (E), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX), (RI) but violates (S). 2F
3.  satisfies (E), (S), (WPDMII), (EX), (RI) but violates (CI). 3F
4.  satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (RI), (EX), (RI) but violates (WPDMII).  4F
5. satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (RI) but violates (EX). 5F
6. satisfies (E), (S), (CI), (WPDMII), (EX) but violates (RI).5F
 
 CHAPTER 6.  
EGALITARIAN SOLUTION 
In this chapter we discuss some problems in the egalitarian solution in finite 
bargaining problems. For a comprehensive problem, whether the problem is convex 
or non-convex, the egalitarian solution to that problem is the one which assigns equal 
utility to each player. But for a finite bargaining problem, the egalitarian solution is 
more complex. 
Egalitarian Solution in Finite Problems 
In bargaining problems with comprehensive and compact feasible sets, including 
convex and non-convex problems, the egalitarian solution is defined as the alternative 
that assigns to each player the same level of utility and that is weakly efficient. In our 
finite bargaining problems, such an alternative may not exist for some problems. The 
Maximin solution and Leximin solutions can be regarded as approximations to the 
Egalitarian solution which is originally defined for comprehensive problem. 
But when we observe the Maximin solution and Leximin solution closely, either 
of them is not the closest approximations to the egalitarian solution for finite 
problems. For example, as illustrated in Figure 20, we may want to argue that 
should be the solution to the problem }{d A since is the closest point to  
If is available in the problem, should be the solution to the problem. 
d ).(Amm
)(Amm )(Amm
If it is not available, the alternative which is closet to it should be the solution, which 
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in the problem illustrated in Figure 20, is . Also, in alternative , the difference 
between utilities that the two players get respectively is smallest, which is the gist of 
the Egalitarian solution.  
d d
In Figure 20, we have but none of is in the solution 
because the distance between and any of is greater than the distance 
between and . respectively. And also the differences between the utilities 
of the two players in those alternatives, for example, for alternative , the difference 
between the utilities of the two players is:
,,, dedcdb >>> ecb ,,
)(Amm ecb ,,
)(Amm d
b
|| 21 bb − , are all greater than the difference 
in alternative  which is: ,d || 21 dd −  
 
Figure 20. The Egalitarian Solution in Finite Bargaining Problem 
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In what follows, we shall illustrate several versions of the egalitarian solution 
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for finite problems.Variants of the Egalitarian Solution. 
Variants of the Egalitarian Solution 
We discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution for finite problems. A 
basic feature of our proposed solution is the following.  Alternatives in a solution to 
a bargaining problem should be those that are “closest” to the center point and are 
weakly efficient; or that are “closest” to the center point among all the alternatives in 
the maximin solution; or that exhibit the “least” degree of inequality in terms of utility 
levels among players and are weakly efficient.  To define our solutions formally, we 
start by discussing the distance between two utility vectors.  
The Definition of Distance 
The “closeness” of two utility vectors is typically measured in terms of the 
distance between them.  Given a distance function, the closer the two alternatives are, 
the shorter the distance between them is.  There are various ways to measure the 
distance between two alternatives. Consider the following examples:  For any 
    ,, nRyx +∈
(1) The sum distance is defined as ∑∈ −= Ni ii yxyxd .||),( , 
(2) The max distance is defined as: .||max),( iiNi yxyxd −= ∈  
In general, a function is considered as a distance function if it has the 
following properties:  for any   
d
,,, nRcba +∈
1.  .0),( =aad
2.  ).,(),( abdbad =
3. ).,(),(),( cbdbadcad +≤  
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Clearly, the sum and the max distance functions satisfy the above requirements 
for a general distance function.    
Egalitarian Solution in Two-Player Problems 
Definition of Egalitarian Solution in 2-player Problems 
First we define the Egalitarian solution in 2-player problems which chooses the 
alternatives which is closest to the center point and which is weakly efficient.  
Definition 6.1. Type I Egalitarian Solution in 2-player problems. A 
bargaining solution  over B is the Egalitarian Solution I if, for all F ∈A B, 
for all )(,()(,(|{)( AmmxdAmmadAaAF ≤∈= Ax∈ and there is no other 
such that  Ax∈ ax >> }.
The distance function can be any one defined in last section. In this two-player 
bargaining model, we can check all of the distance functions give us the same result.  
Second, we confine our attention to the alternative which is closest to the center 
point among those belonging to the maximin solution. In a 2-player problem, the 
measurement of the distance between the alternative in the maximin and the center 
point coincides with each other and can be expressed as: ,))(,( 21 xxAmmxd −= . 
Since , )min(max Aix∈ )(),min( 21 Ammxx i= . Then the second type of the 
definition of egalitarian solution in 2-player problems is defined as in Definition 6.2 
below. 
Definition 6.2. Type II Egalitarian solution for 2-player bargaining 
problems: When  the type II egalitarian solution is defined as follows:  ,2=n
For any ∈A B, |}|||)min(max{)( 2121 xxaaAiaAF −≤−∈=  for 
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all  )}.min(max Aix∈
Thirdly, we define the solution which chooses the alternatives which have the 
smallest difference between the player’s utilities and which are weakly efficient.  For 
a 2-player game, the measurement of the difference between the utilities of two 
players is given by,  So the definition of the type III Egalitarian solution is 
as follows: 
.|| 21 xx −
Definition 6.3. Type III Egalitarian Solution for 2-player bargaining 
problems: When  the egalitarian solution is defined as follows:  ,2=n
For any ∈A B, ||||{)( 2121 xxaaAaAF −≤−∈=  for all Ax∈ and there is no 
such that   Ax∈ .}ax >>
It is easy to verify that the three types of the Egalitarian solution defined above 
coincide with each other for 2-player bargaining problems.  As a consequence, in the 
following discussion concerning 2-player bargaining problems, we will not make a 
distinction and will use the egalitarian solution to refer to all of them. 
Characterization of Egalitarian Solution in 2-player Problem 
Theorem 6.1: (WE), (S), (CI), (HE) uniquely determine the egalitarian solution 
for 2-Player bargaining problems. 
Proof of Theorem 6.1. It can be checked that the Egalitarian solution for 
two-player bargaining problems satisfies (WE), (S), (CI), (HE). We therefore need to 
show that if a solution satisfies (WE), (S), (CI), (HE), then it must be the Egalitarian 
Solution for two-player bargaining problems. 
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Figure 21. Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 6.1 
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Let a solution satisfy (WE), (S), (CI), and (HE) and let F ∈A B.  Define 
From Figure 6.2, we can see that, for any belonging 
to Egalitarian solution of 
}.,:)({ 2 Π∈∈∈≡ + ππ AaRaB a
B , and any other alternative ,ax ≠ either ,ax << like 
point or ,d jjii xaax <≤≤ or jjii xaax ≤<≤ or jjii xaax ≤≤< like point 
 then by the non-emptiness of the solution and (HE), (WE), egalitarian 
solution of the problem By S, any belonging to the Egalitarian solution of 
.,cb ⊆)(BF
.B a
B )(BF⊆ . Therefore }),(,{)( Π∈= ππ aaBF  follows from (HE).  By (CI), 
is given by the Egalitarian solution. )(AF
Egalitarian Solutions in More-Than-Two-Player Problems 
The egalitarian solution is straightforward and unambiguous in a two-player 
bargaining problem. But in a problem with more than two players, according to type 
III definition, we need to find a point which is on the weak efficient frontier and 
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which has the smallest difference of the utilities of all players. But when  how 
can we tell the difference of the utilities that all the players get is smaller or bigger? 
For example, consider the following two alternatives: and .  How 
can we tell which point has the bigger difference?   
,2>n
)8,6,4,1( ),9,5,3,2(
Also in a problem with more than two players, the type I solution and type II 
solution are different in general. For example, for a problem },,0{ baA = with 
and if we use the max distance, we can see, according to 
type I egalitarian solution, 
)3,2,1(=a ),2.2,1.2,9.0(=b
},{)( bAF = while according to type II egalitarian solution, 
 }.{)( aAF =
In the next section we focus on the type I (which confines to the weakly efficient 
alternatives in the problem) and type II (which confines to the alternatives in the 
Maximin solution of the problem) Egalitarian solution in the bargaining problems 
with more than two players. From the following definitions we can see, in the 
bargaining problems with more than two players, not only type I and type II solutions 
are different, but with different distance definitions, we can get different definitions of 
Egalitarian solutions from the same type as well.     
Type I Egalitarian Solution 
As defined in definition 6.1, type I Egalitarian solution is the alternatives which 
are “closest” to the center point among all weakly efficient alternatives. By using 
different distance functions, we can define various type I Egalitarian solutions below. 
Definition 6.4. Type I Egalitarian Solution with sum distance. A bargaining 
solution  over B is the Egalitarian Solution I if, for all F ∈A B, 
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))(,()(,(|{)( AmmxdAmmadAaAF ≤∈= for all Ax∈ and there is no other 
such that  Ax∈ ax >> }.
The distance functions are discussed in definition of distance section. 
Type II Egalitarian Solution 
Type II Egalitarian solution is defined as the alternatives which are “closest” to 
the center point among all the alternatives in the Maximin solution of the problem. 
Also, we can define various solution using different distance functions. 
Definition 6.5. Type I Egalitarian Solution with sum distance. A bargaining 
solution  over B is Egalitarian Solution I with sum distance if, for all F ∈A B, 
iNiiNi
i xaAFaAF ∈∈ ∑∑ ≤∈= |)({)( minmax for all  )}.(minmax AFx i∈
The distance behind this definition is ∑∈ −= Ni ii yxyxd .||),(  To see this, we 
note that we are confined to the alternatives which belong to the maximin solution, 
the center point of a problem A, is ).(Ammy = ; then the minimization 
problem  where belongs to the Maximin solution of the problem is the 
same as 
),(: yxdMin x
.:min||:∑ ∑∈ ∈=−Ni Ni iii xyxMin  
Definition 6.6. Type II Egalitarian Solution with max distance. A bargaining 
solution  over B is Egalitarian Solution with max distance if, for all F ∈A B, 
for all  }{}{|)({)( minmax iNiiNi
i xMaxaMaxAFaAF ∈∈ ≤∈= }.minmax AFx i∈
The distance behind this definition is .||max),( iiNi yxyxd −= ∈ Note that the 
distance between any  and is )(minmax AFx i∈ )(Amm }{max iiNi x α−∈  
.}{max iiNi x α−= ∈  So the minimization problem is the same 
as  
))(,(:min Ammxd
}.{max:min iNi x∈
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Definition 6.7. Type II Egalitarian Solution with general distance function. 
A bargaining solution  over B is the Egalitarian Solution with a general distance 
function if, for all 
F
d ∈A B, for 
all  
)(,()(,(|)({)( minmax AmmxdAmmadAFaAF i ≤∈=
}.minmax AFx i∈
Additional Properties Used in This Section 
Axiom 6.1: Strong expansion Consistency (SEC): For each B 
with , if 
∈BA,
BA⊆ A is symmetric, )(}{ AFa = and is weakly efficient on then 
 
a ,B
).(}{ BFa =
Strong expansion Consistency is another type of expansion property similar to 
expansion consistency described in Axiom 3.9. It requires that, given a symmetric 
problem A that has as the unique solution, ifa A is enlarged to B so that B  is a 
superset of A and if continues to be weakly efficient ona B , then should still be 
the unique solution of
a
B . The difference between SEC and EC is that after the 
enlargement, SEC requires that is still the solution to the new problem while EC 
requires that that is contained in the solution to the enlarged problem. 
}{a
a
Axiom 6.2: Substitution Property (SP): For any symmetric ∈A B with 
for   is weakly efficient in then if 
for all  
},{)( aAF = ,nRx +∈ x },{xA∪
),(),( aydaxd < }/{aAy∈ ⇒A );/}{(}{ axAFx ∪= and if  
for all   
),(),( aydaxd ≤
}/{aAy∈ ⇒ )./}{( axAFx ∪∈
Axiom 6.2 is straightforward. If we substitute the unique solution in a 
symmetric problem with an alternative which is weakly efficient in the new problem 
and also is closer to the original solution than any other alternatives from the original 
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problem, then this substitution should be the only alternative chosen by the solution to 
the new problem; if that substitution is one of the alternatives which are closest to the 
original solution, it then belongs to  the solution to the new problem. 
Characterization of Type I Egalitarian Solution in More-Than-Two-Player Problems 
Theorem 6.2: The Type I Egalitarian solution is uniquely determined by (WE), 
(S), (CI), (SEC), (SP). 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. It can be checked that the Egalitarian Solution satisfies 
(WE), (S), (CI), (SEC), (SP). We therefore need to show that if a 
solution satisfies(WE), (S), (CI), (SEC), (SP), then it must be the Egalitarian 
Solution. 
F
For any ∈A B, first let  For a bargaining problem  by (WE), 
Note that is symmetric and also is weakly 
efficient in by (SEC) we get that 
).(Amma = },,0{ a
).(}{ AFa = },0{ a },{},0{ aAa ∪⊆ a
},{aA∪ }).{( aAFa ∪=  
(i). If  then we get the conclusion. ,Aa∈ ).(AFa =
(ii). If let ,Aa∉ =B zAz |{ ∈ is closest to a in A and no Ax∈ such that 
then }.ax >> B is type I egalitarian solution of the problem.  
We want to show that ).(AFB =  
First we show that  .)( BAF ⊆
Let  Construct the symmetric bargaining problem =C ./ BA
}.,:)({}{ Π∈∈∪= ππ CxxaD By the same reasoning as above,   ).(DFa =
Noting that is symmetric and for any D ,Bz∈  is weakly efficient in 
is closer to than any other alternative in then  by (SP), we can 
z
},{zD∪ z a },/{aD
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get   })./{}){(( azDFz ∪=
Noting that ,}{}]/{}){[( CzAazD ∪=∩∪  that is, 
and by (CI), we can get },/{}){(}{ azDCz ∪⊆∪ ).}({}{ CzFz ∪=  
That is, for any ,Bz∈ ),}({}{ CzFz ∪= where =C ./ BA  Then if there is an 
and that is, )(AFx∈ ,Bx∉ )(AFx∈ and ,Cx∈ then by CI, we can get 
it is a contradiction to ),}({ CzFx ∪∈ ).}({}{ CzFz ∪= Therefore if , 
 
)(AFx∈
.Bx∈
Next, we show that  ).(AFB ⊆
For any let Construct a symmetric problem ,Bz∈ }./{zAX =
}.,:)({}{ Π∈∈∪= ππ XxxaY  By the same reasoning as above,  Noting 
that is symmetric and for 
).(YFa =
Y ,Bz∈  is weakly efficient in is among the 
closest to in the alternative in , then  by (SP), we can get 
 Noting that then by (CI) we can get 
z },{zY ∪ z
a },/{aY
})./{}){(( azYFz ∪∈ }),/{}){(( azYFA ∪⊆
).(AFz∈
 
 CHAPTER 7.  
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this dissertation, we have extended the standard bargaining model to the one 
that consists of all finite bargaining problems. First we define and characterize various 
solutions which extend their counterparts in convex and non-convex but 
comprehensive problems. Then we study other solutions which are new and unique in 
finite problems. Finally, we present several variants of the Egalitarian solution for 
finite bargaining problem.  
From the first part of our work, we note that the standard extensions of the 
Nash’s original axioms for convex problems to our problem continue to give the 
characterization result of the Nash solution for finite bargaining problems. The 
behaviors of the other solutions that extend the Maximin, the Leximin, the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of convex 
bargaining problems are quite different: they all are closely connected with various 
versions of expansion consistency and domination. 
In our studies of the Utilitarian solution and the two new solutions combining 
the Maximin solution and the Utilitarian solution in different ways: 
Maximin-Utilitarian solution and Utilitarian-Maximin solution, we note that it is 
probably the first time that the axioms relating to the Pigou-Dalton domination are 
used in the characterizations of the solutions in bargaining theory.   
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     Finally we discuss the egalitarian solution and present some approaches to 
study the egalitarian solution for finite problems. Depending on choices of the 
distance function and the “reference point” from which the distance is calculated 
between a point in the solution and this reference point, we can have various 
egalitarian solutions.   
Our axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of the various standard 
solutions of convex bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems have shed new 
light on the behavior of these solutions. The difference between Utilitarian-Maximin 
solution and Maximin-Utilitarian solution and the complexity of the Egalitarian 
solution arising from finite bargaining problems are evidences that finite problems are 
unique and are more complicated than bargaining problems with comprehensive 
feasible sets.  As a future research agenda, it would be interesting to explore other 
possibilities. 
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